Published on the eve of the European Union elections, Revolt on the Right is a highly topical account of what the authors term ¡°one of the most successful challenges to the established political parties in modern Britain¡±. Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin follow the UK Independence Party from its establishment in ¡°the dusty office¡± of a London School of Economics history lecturer to its current status as the ¡°most significant new British political party in a generation¡± under the leadership of Nigel Farage. Their most important findings concern the nature of the party¡¯s voting base.

In short, Ukip supporters are not who we think they are. They are neither single-issue anti-EU voters nor middle-aged, middle-class Tories suspicious of David Cameron¡¯s policies. Rather, Ukip¡¯s support base is predominantly working class ¨C in fact, the most working-class base for a major party since Michael Foot¡¯s Labour. Drawing on an impressive pool of survey data, the authors show that those most likely to vote Ukip are angry old white men: the older, less skilled, less educated working-class voters who have been ¡°written out of the political debate¡±. These voters attach a broader meaning to their dislike of the EU, linking it to concerns about immigration, access to welfare, Britain¡¯s sovereignty and future, and dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. These groups had initially turned their backs on politics, but Ukip has offered them an outlet and a voice for their concerns.

This finding is significant. Ford and Goodwin argue that because Ukip¡¯s support is predominantly working class, it poses a significant threat to Labour, not just the Tories as has been assumed. Therefore Ukip is dangerous. Curbing its support is not simply a question of the Tories pushing for stricter immigration policies and a stronger anti-EU stance. The party¡¯s rise is largely attributable to its ability to push a ¡°value divide¡± to the forefront of the political agenda.

Yet why should the finding that Ukip¡¯s support base includes predominantly older working-class white men necessarily entail a big threat to Labour? After all, there has always been a sizeable proportion of the working class that voted for parties other than Labour. These voters could simply be part of the Tory working-class base, swing voters or voters who abstain altogether, all part of a pool on which Labour support does not necessarily depend.

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And if this is true, how does it compare with support for the radical Right across Europe? While many such European parties make a similar ¡°value divide¡± pitch, in some cases the support base differs fundamentally. For example, in contrast to Ukip¡¯s angry old white men ¨C and even the BNP¡¯s angry young white men ¨C supporters of Golden Dawn in Greece come from many different educational, professional, age and class backgrounds.

If Ford and Goodwin are correct ¨C if Ukip¡¯s rise isn¡¯t just about annoyed Tories but about deeply disenfranchised, ¡°left behind¡±, working-class groups ¨C then Labour will find itself in a precarious situation in coming elections. Even more importantly, the cultural divide will play a fundamental role in reconfiguring partisan alignments, and Ukip may be here to stay. Yet the main test for the party will not necessarily be its performance during this month¡¯s second-order EU elections, but rather the 2015 national elections and beyond.

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